Benjamin and Swanson’s book on Nato is an essential antidote to the chorus of media and political voices supporting the belligerent organisation and its wars, argues Sean Ledwith

Trump’s recent re-election as US President has revived fears within the Nato alliance about his commitment to the organisation that celebrated its seventy-fifth anniversary this year. In his first term, Trump conspicuously questioned the relevance of the alliance founded as the cold war unfolded in the aftermath of World War II, even to the extent of hinting that the US might withdraw from it. Earlier this year, while on the campaign trail, he rhetorically threatened other Nato states with the same outcome if they did not, in his eyes, step up financially. In his usual overblown style, he suggested Putin could attack with impunity any Nato member supposedly not contributing appropriately: ‘I said: “You didn’t pay? You’re delinquent?” … “No I would not protect you, in fact I would encourage them to do whatever they want. You gotta pay”.’

Trump’s re-election has inevitably also seen a flurry of Nato leaders falling over themselves to underline the supposed ongoing significance of the alliance. Predictably, Keir Starmer has been in the forefront of this drumbeat of militarism. He used his first PMQs after the US election to state: ‘There is no more important duty than keeping the people of this country safe. The Labour government that signed the Nato Treaty in the first place and we are strong supporters. [sic]’ Starmer and his cabinet have similarly been explicitly committed to achieving the goal of spending 2.5% of GDP on defence at some point in the near future, in line with Nato requirements.

Guns or butter?

How this is compatible with rebooting investment in health, education, transport and other underfunded areas of the public sector is never explained. Starmer’s goal of normalising ramped-up military spending is made easier by the conspicuous absence of voices in the mainstream media questioning either the need for such extravagant re-armament or the role of Nato itself. All we usually get on the news is a succession of generals and admirals claiming we need even more hi-tech weaponry in the face of a supposed Russian or Chinese threat.

Earlier this year, coverage of Nato’s seventy-fifth anniversary in April was similarly uncritical in most of the Western media. The event was the signal for self-congratulatory rhetoric from the key figures of the Western military alliance. US President Biden asserted: ‘The fact that Nato remains the bulwark of global security did not happen by accident. It wasn’t inevitable. Again and again, at critical moments, we chose unity over disunion, progress over retreat, freedom over tyranny, and hope over fear.’ Outgoing Secretary General of the organisation, Jens Stoltenburg, claimed: ‘Peace has been preserved. Freedom has been safeguarded. That makes NATO the most successful alliance in history. So in this seventy-fifth anniversary of our Alliance, we can finally say that NATO is not only the most successful, and strongest, But also the longest-lasting Alliance in history.’ A few months later, Starmer was elected as UK PM and it did not take him long to join the eulogistic chorus to money-no-object militarism, with his usual sanctimonious tone:

‘Nato has become the most successful alliance in history precisely because democracy, freedom and the rule of law were hardwired into the Nato Charter. And that is the legacy we inherit today. An inheritance not just of an institution but of a duty and of service. And it is our duty now.’

Medea Benjamin and David Swanson’s Nato: What You Need To Know is the perfect antidote, therefore, to all this adulatory backslapping from the figureheads of Western imperialism. Comprehensively, they dissect the myths that surround seventy-five years of US and European sabre-rattling and plundering that now goes under the guise of what is laughably known as the rules-based order. Their critique is particularly valuable as the mainstream media is nowadays totally uncritical of Nato and it is virtually unheard of for any British politician to express even the mildest hint of nonconformity regarding the organisation’s goals.

Imagine the reaction to an MP who spoke about Nato in the terms used by these authors: ‘Nato remains lost in an echo chamber of misplaced triumphalism and dishonest, one-sided threat assessments that render it incapable of learning from its own history’ (p.34).The book is alsoa timely rebuttal to that other trope of the dominant news agenda that Russia alone is responsible for the bloody imbroglio in Ukraine. They pointedly remind us that Nato leaders were responsible for quashing negotiations that could have ended the war in its first month (p.3). Don’t expect a reporter on the BBC to mention that anytime soon.

Trump and Nato

Benjamin and Swanson’s discussion of the reality of Trump’s supposed anti-Nato agenda is particularly valuable in light of his imminent return to the White House. Despite the rhetorical belligerence of some of his remarks about the alliance, his first term as President actually marked a consolidation of Washington’s role as the core component of the organisation. In their words: ‘reviewing Trump’s performance as US President from 2017 to 2021, we can surely conclude that, with enemies like Trump, Nato – and the global war machine – hardly needs friends’ (p.115). The authors point out this period saw Colombia added to the organisation as a South American partner, Brazil approached to do the same, the largest Nato military exercises in Europe up to that point and the scuppering of talk about non-Nato-based European defence. Any notion that a Trump second term might see a return to isolationism in US foreign policy appears similarly doubtful in light of other overseas adventures conducted by his first administration such as bombing Syria and Iran, and ripping up both the deals regarding INF missiles and the Iran nuclear programme.

The other key anxiety among other Nato leaders regarding Trump, apart from fear he may quit the alliance altogether, is the notion that he might be less than enthusiastic about sustaining military aid to the Zelensky regime in Ukraine. The unspoken assumption in most of these discussions, both in Western parliaments and in the media, is that such aid is essential as the war against Putin’s occupation is a straightforward contest between democracy and autocracy. Benjamin and Swanson perform another valuable corrective to this dominant narrative by highlighting Nato’s perfidious role in triggering and sustaining the pointless stalemate in that country. They point out that the organisation rashly seduced Ukrainian politicians in the years prior to Putin’s invasion of 2022 with the temptation of Nato membership, despite warnings from senior foreign-policy figures that such a move would trigger Russian intervention. William Burns was George Bush Jnr’s Ambassador to Moscow and in 2008 he warned his boss that:

‘Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over Nato membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. Russia would have to decide whether to intervene – a decision Russia does not want to have to face’ (p.57).

Many readers will be surprised to learn that Nato forces were active in Ukraine in the years leading up to the 2022 invasion. The authors note there were 300 US military trainers at a base in Yavoriv, who were eventually joined by 200 Canadians and 75 British troops, all operating under official Nato command. In addition, Washington was providing $75 million of non-lethal military aid to Kiev at a time that the Minsk II Accords negotiated by France, Germany and Russia in 2015 were seeking to de-escalate the situation. None of this justifies Putin’s naked aggression and its devastating impact on the populations of both Ukraine and Russia, but it does give the lie to the standard Western view that the war is solely Moscow’s responsibility (p.59).

Benjamin and Swanson are particularly scathing about Boris Johnson’s involvement in the early phase of the Ukraine war: an episode that is also rarely mentioned in the British media. They note that in April 2022, Johnson, still UK PM at the time, flew to Kiev to scupper a deal negotiated by Turkey and accepted by Zelensky that Russia would withdraw its forces from the occupied Eastern regions of the country in return for a commitment from the West that Nato membership would not happen and that Nato forces would never return. In light of the bloody mess that has unfolded over the following two years, many analysts might say that this was the best possible deal available. According to the authors, however, ‘Johnson flew into Kiev and told Zelensky that the collective West would not support the agreement and the talks ended’ (p.62). They could have added that this was a typically cynical ploy by Johnson to use a foreign war to distract from the mounting domestic crises that would force him out of Number Ten shortly afterwards.

Ominously, Nato leaders still talk about the conflict in Ukraine as winnable from their viewpoint. Biden, now in the twilight of his Presidency, has now authorised US Stormshadow missiles being used by Zelensky’s forces, supported by Nato personnel, strike deep into Russian territory. Western politicians and media commentators are currently guilty of failing to advise their populations about how dangerous and reckless such an escalation would be. As Benjamin and Swanson bluntly state: ‘Direct involvement of Nato troops could lead to World War III, even a nuclear war’ (p.63). Blandishments by those same war-mongering voices that such an outcome is unlikely, the authors shrewdly note, ignores the warning of an ancient Chinese philosopher which could be applied to the whole misplaced rationale of Nato: ‘If you don’t change direction, you may end up where you are heading’ (p.64).