The brief general strike exposed the mounting economic and political damage the war is doing to Israel itself, but Palestine solidarity movements must press on, argues John Clarke

The discovery on 1 September of the bodies of six of the Israelis being held captive in Gaza was met with shock and anger within Israel, with many concluding that Netanyahu’s efforts to impede a ceasefire agreement had led to these deaths. Family members and supporters of the captives took this position and defence minister Yoav Gallant suggested that ‘Netanyahu’s insistence on holding on to strategic territory in Gaza [was] the principal obstacle to a deal.’ He ‘issued a statement calling for the cabinet to reverse a vote on Thursday to retain control of the Philadelphi corridor, along Gaza’s border with Egypt.’

By that evening, a large-scale response was already underway. The Jerusalem Post reported that protests had blocked the entrance to Jerusalem and that it took police two hours to open a way through. It added that according ‘to the Hostage and Missing Families Forum, three hundred thousand people have gathered in Tel Aviv in mass protest.’ There were also demonstrations and disruptive actions in other parts of Israel.

As the day unfolded, Arnon Bar-David, who leads theHistadrut trade-union federation, issued a statement calling for general strike action to begin the next day. ‘We must stop the abandonment of the hostages … I have come to the conclusion that only our intervention can shake those who need to be shaken,’ it proclaimed. ‘Starting tomorrow at six in the morning, the entire Israeli economy will go on complete strike.’

That the Histadrut initiative reflected deep divisions within Israeli society was very clear. Predictably, the far-right finance minister Bezalel Smotrich responded unambiguously. He told reporters that Bar-David ‘is actually fulfilling [Hamas leader Yahya] Sinwar’s dream, and instead of representing the Israeli workers, he chooses to represent the interests of Hamas.’

Smotrich also issued instructions that ‘that anyone who strikes tomorrow will not be paid and I am happy to see that there are local authorities who do not align themselves with the decision of the chairman of the Histadrut. I call on the workers to come to work tomorrow and not lend a hand to a shutdown that harms the State of Israel during wartime.’

Major impact

The strike unfolded on 2 September and it had a major impact on the Israeli economy even though it was short lived. According to Al Jazeera, large ‘parts of Israel’s economy shut down for hours before a labour court ordered protesters to return to work at 2:30pm.’ Schools and government buildings were closed and ‘Ben Gurion International Airport, Israel’s main airport, shut down from 8am until the strike was called off.’

The differences within Israeli society that led to the strike were obviously not along any clear class lines. ‘The Israel Business Forum, which represents private sector workers from 200 of the country’s largest companies, joined the strike as did companies from Israel’s tech sector including Wix, Fiverr, HoneyBook, Playtika, Riskified, and Lemonade.’ The Manufacturers Association of Israel also added its support ‘accusing the government of failing in its “moral duty” to bring the captives back alive.’

However, as National Public Radio in the US noted, ‘in a sign of the country’s deep political divisions, not all regions or businesses said they were participating in the strike with several members of Netanyahu’s governing coalition continuing to publicly reject any type of cease-fire.’ In any event, once the court issued its instructions, the ‘Histadrut union said it abided the decision and called off the strike.’

Doubtless, as the months have dragged on, while an obdurate Netanyahu government continues the conflict with no discernible exit strategy, the tensions in Israel have increased. The huge protests that have taken place and the highly significant strike action are by far the sharpest expressions of the divisions that exist. It can only be expected, moreover, that the differences will become even sharper in the period ahead.

Not only is Netanyahu continuing the onslaught on Gaza and undermining ceasefire efforts at every turn, but the conflict is being widened. An horrific attack on the West Bank is now underway and, even as the protests were occurring in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, the city of Jenin was facing a devastating assault by Israeli occupation forces. Al Jazeera notes that the ‘Israeli military brought in reinforcements on Sunday after demolishing shops and bulldozing streets, while preventing tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians from accessing humanitarian aid, in a step described as a “war crime”.’

Shockingly, according ‘to the Jenin municipality, the Israeli army has bulldozed nearly 70 percent of the city’s streets and 20km [12.4 miles] of its water and sewage networks since it launched its raids on Wednesday, August 28. As a result, 80 percent of the Jenin refugee camp, home to 20,000 people, is left without water access, the Jenin municipality said.’ A ‘flat out war’ is now underway in the West Bank, even as the genocide in Gaza continues.

At the same time, the threat of an all-out confrontation with Hezbollah, which has a much greater military capacity than the armed resistance in Gaza, continues to loom and the timing of Iran’s retaliation for Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran is still an open question. That Israel is pursuing such a course of action, with such massive risks and implications, can only create internal divisions of a very deep and fundamental nature.

Changed situation

An article in Middle East Monitor in July considered the ways in which the attack on Gaza had generated massive problems for Israel. It reported that as ‘a result of Israel’s longest war since it was established on the land of Palestine in 1948, some 46,000 companies have closed in Israel … Israeli economists believe this will rise to 100,000 by the end of this year.’

The economic dislocation is greatly compounded by the need to keep reservists in active military duty and despite ‘the generous American financial and military support, the Israeli army is suffering a severe shortage of arms. Some kinds of essential weapons such as 120mm mortars fired by tanks have almost completely run out.’

Armed to the teeth by the US-led West, Israel has long used its military superiority to strike decisively and obtain its objectives through short, sharp conflicts and massively disproportionate acts of retaliation. Since 7 October, this method of operating, and with it the stability of Israeli society, has been overturned. A wide section of the population is simply not ready to accept such a massive change and the social and political tensions that are being generated flow from this.

Given the continuing effort to obliterate Gaza, the all-out assault on the West Bank and the readiness to risk regional conflagration, it is clear that the present Israeli government, the most right-wing ever, is working to complete the dispossession of the Palestinians regardless of the consequences. In doing this, it is advancing the agenda of one wing of Israeli society and confronting an opposing camp in the process.

Ilan Pappé, writing in New Left Review in June, characterised the two sides in this social conflict in a particular way. He suggested that one ‘camp can be termed the “State of Israel”. It comprises more secular, liberal and mostly but not exclusively middle-class European Jews and their descendants, who were instrumental in establishing the state in 1948 and remained hegemonic within it until the end of the last century.’ Their goal ‘is for Jewish citizens to live in a democratic and pluralist society from which Arabs are excluded.’

On the other side, Pappé wrote of ‘the ‘State of Judea’, which developed among the settlers of the occupied West Bank.’ This camp, embodying strong currents of religious fanaticism, ‘is determined to reduce the number of Palestinians to a bare minimum [and] renew the golden era of the Biblical Kingdoms.’ The elevated political fortunes of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir show the ground that has been gained by this more extreme camp. Indeed, Pappé noted that more ‘than half a million Israelis, representing the State of Israel, have left the country since October, an indication that the country is being engulfed by the State of Judea.’

The mass protests, the Histadrut strike, the disagreements over the assault on Gaza and the expendability of the Israeli captives reflect this widening social and political rift. It must be stressed that, while there are important voices within Jewish Israeli society that express solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, neither side in the dispute is questioning the Zionist project for a moment.

The way forward won’t be found by placing hopes in a more ‘moderate’ brand of Zionism but in Palestinian resistance and movements of international solidarity that can challenge the role of the US-led West in sustaining the Israeli state. However, the discord that exists inside Israeli society is of considerable importance and it speaks to the health and prospects of the colonial project. The recent mass protests and the Histadrut strike are the sharpest expression yet of differences within Zionism that can only widen under the volatile and dangerous conditions that have developed.