Another snap election, this one in Germany, poses problems for the ruling parties, but there are multiple problems with the two competing left parties, Robert Dale explains

So Chancellor Olaf Scholz is following Rishi Sunak and French President Emmanuel Macron to call an early election his government looks set to lose. Germany’s ruling coalition has collapsed and the country will go to the polls in February. The last straw was essentially a dispute over additional funding for the war in Ukraine. Not that either side opposed the spending, but social-democratic Chancellor Olaf Scholz wanted to relax the tight rules restricting government borrowing, while his free-market liberal Finance Minister Christian Lindner insisted on further cuts in social spending instead.

In the background lie much larger problems. Robert Habeck, the coalition’s Green deputy leader, named them shortly before the decision: the economy, Ukraine, Trump. Sharply rising energy prices have hit Germany’s manufacturing sector hard. The economy is stagnant, slipping into recession. Plant closures are in the air, along with relocation, especially to the United States. The unions’ response to Volkswagen’s announcement that it intends to close three car factories has been tepid so far, and the recent pay settlement in the metalworking sector has disappointed many members.

Much of the economic malaise can be attributed to the Ukraine war, through the effects of sanctions and rising energy prices. The German ruling class has seized the moment to initiate an unprecedented militarisation. Most public discussion simply assumes that the war is justified and must be won, with debate essentially revolving around the question of what weapons system to send next. Opponents are marginalised and smeared as ‘Putin fans’. Yet opinion polls show a majority against further arms supplies. Since February 2023, there have been three national anti-war demonstrations, organised in particular by the group around Sahra Wagenknecht (of which more later).

The government is deeply unpopular, with approval around 14%. Real wages are still lower than in 2020. A wave of strikes in 2022–23 produced modest gains, but remained entirely under the control of union leaders. Although inflation has receded, the price of food, fuel and other necessities remains a hot topic, as does the housing crisis. Dissatisfaction is widespread but finds no focus.

All three governing parties stand to lose votes, and the Free Democrats may struggle to pass the 5% threshold for representation in parliament. The opposition Christian Democrats are expected to become the strongest party. And the far-right Alternative for Germany will also increase its vote, but there is no great enthusiasm for any of the alternatives. For many voters, the question will be which party they least dislike, or which unpopular party they support in order to keep out one they see as worse.

The left

Two left organisations will stand. The established Left Party is currently polling around 3% and will only return to parliament if it can win three seats outright. At its high point in 2009 (11%) it had significant working-class support, especially in eastern Germany and amongst the poorest. Most of that has been lost, shrinking the party’s electoral base essentially to student and left intellectual milieus. This is reflected in the electoral map, where it does best in the gentrified and gentrifying urban cores. This decline comes after a decade and a half of participation in local and state governments, where it has often agreed to spending cuts and privatisation. 

The party’s active membership is concentrated in those same milieus, with a comparatively large number whose employment depends on its apparatus and electoral successes. Several Trotskyist groups operate within it. The party’s members and resources have played a crucial role in anti-fascist mobilisations. It has a clear profile on climate, migration and discrimination, but is widely perceived as neglecting the material needs of ordinary people. Its positions on Ukraine and Gaza have been ambiguous and it has lost the support of those who regard peace as a priority. 

That was the background to the split in early 2024. A group of ten Bundestag deputies led by Sahra Wagenknecht left to set up their own party in time for the European elections, where there is no threshold excluding smaller parties. For the moment, it operates as the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), on the basis that she is nationally prominent (and notorious). Wagenknecht had for quite some time been criticising the Left Party’s detachment from ordinary people (and published a book slating what she called the ‘lifestyle left’). Before the split, she and her associates consistently opposed the Ukraine war and all German involvement, including sanctions.

The BSW was successful in the June 2024 European elections, polling 6.2% (Left Party 2.7%). Since then, it has also been elected to three eastern state parliaments, and has joined one coalition government at state level. So far, it has been built in a top-down fashion, and has only about 800 members. Its leadership is focused on attracting voters outside the middle-class and activist milieus (and largely avoids labelling itself ‘left’).

The BSW is the only party unequivocally to oppose the Ukraine war and the massive increase in military spending, and expresses clear (if quiet) criticism of Israel’s destruction of Gaza. It is perceived as an advocate of the less well-off, although its actual policies are less clear. It also makes a point of supporting freedom of expression for critical opinions (centring on Ukraine and Covid). It calls for controls on migration, for which it is vehemently criticised (and to an extent ostracised) by a great deal of the reformist and revolutionary left. On the other side, it endures a diatribe of defamation from the mainstream parties and most of the press for its clear anti-war line.

The example of Carola Rakete illustrates the dilemma. Rackete, who is prominent in the refugee support movement, won a seat for the Left Party in the European Elections. One of her first actions as an MEP was to support a resolution calling for increased military support for Ukraine (one of the Left Party’s three MEPs voted against, the other abstained). So we have one left party with a good line on migration but a poor record on Ukraine, and another where the situation is reversed. Under present circumstances, it is probably fair to say that a party campaigning consistently for open borders is unlikely to pass the 5% threshold.

Both parties have something to offer for the broader left. Neither is the party we really need.