This year’s Socialist Register outlines increasing geopolitical instability and the dangers of catastrophic war, which only socialist organising can counter, finds John Clarke

As the title suggests, this year’s Socialist Register places an emphasis on exploring the profound changes that are unfolding on an international scale. The fourteen chapters, with eighteen contributors, explore different elements of this overriding question and do so from a range of perspectives. However, a strong sense that the ground is shifting in decisive ways is common to all of them.

In the preface, editors Greg Albo, Steve Mahar, Alan Zuege and Colin Leys provide us with some of the key considerations that the contributors will explore. They make clear that this edition continues an ongoing project of ‘investigating the forces that [are] redrawing the map of global capitalism’ (p.ix). In the face of huge tensions and massive disruptions, the ‘capacity of the American state to dictate and enforce – on its own or in concert with its Western allies – the rules of international order is facing unprecedented difficulties’ (p.xi).

The editors draw attention to the debate that is unfolding over ‘whether the American empire is entering a phase of inexorable decline’ (p.xii). Despite the remarkable resilience of US global leadership, it ‘seems clear that the American state is no longer capable of the unilateralism it brandished in the early 2000s’ (p.xiii). At such a decisive turning point, this ‘volume is an attempt to grapple with this emerging world order, and to assess its implications for socialist strategy and the overlapping forms of national and geopolitical crises we are confronting today’ (p.iv).

Faltering hegemony

In the first chapter, Jerome Klassen argues that for ‘the “new mandarins” of the liberal establishment in Washington – whose return to the White House was premised on restoring the “sources of American power” after the Trump presidency – 2023 was a reality check.’ This harsh experience has involved a series of developments in which the ‘limits of American power were not simply exposed for sober senses, but were resisted by a welter of actors’ (p.1).

The Biden administration’s ‘struggle for comprehensive primacy’ (p.3) has run into difficulties and Klassen explores the faltering US hegemony that marks the present period. US efforts to contain rivals, especially China, are failing and its efforts to retain dominance are creating ever greater tensions, even among allies. Yet, the US remains ‘the greatest purveyor of violence in the world’ (p.25) and containing and defeating its destructive role remains a critical task for our movements.

In the second chapter, Ingo Schmidt, suggests that US hegemony, which has been linked to a neoliberal world order since Ronald Reagan, has been ‘undermined by the rise of economic powers, most significantly China, that developed within the US-shaped international order but were able to retain a degree of sovereignty …’. Both Trump and Biden, ‘in partly different and partly overlapping ways,’ have sought to address this situation and ‘restore world leadership’ (p.34).

In this situation, the great difficulty facing global capitalism is that the ‘rising economic powers aren’t anywhere near forming a historical bloc that could take the place that the US and its allies have held since the end of World War II.’ This has generated a complex and dangerous situation in which ‘US capitalism is too weak to lead. But it is also too big to fail’ (p.35).

The third chapter, by John Bellamy Foster, shatters illusions that the relative decline of US dominance means a reduced risk of catastrophic military conflict. He focuses on the ultimate horror of the threat of nuclear confrontation, noting that in ‘the period after the demise of the Soviet Union, the US worked to “reestablish its absolute nuclear dominance”’ (p.58).

Foster traces the process by which the notion of the deployment of nuclear weapons as a restraining threat went over to ‘a counterforce revolution initiated by Washington … [that] was aimed precisely at making nuclear weapons usable’ (p.59). He points to the ‘coincidence of declining US hegemony in the world economy, with the US attempt to secure unipolar dominance by military means.’ He suggests that this ‘has enormously increased the likelihood of global thermonuclear war’ (p.60).

The next chapter, by Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, contributes to ‘discussions on how best to assess current geopolitical dynamics.’ In this regard, it argues for ‘a historical materialist focus on the content of form [that] allows us to conceptualize best the internal relations between the contemporary states-system (form) and capitalism (content) within the geopolitics of global capitalism’ (p.82).

The authors then ‘analyze the dynamics underpinning the current war in Ukraine and the tensions over Taiwan, revealing how intensified capitalist competition against the background of the crisis of fossil-fuel based capitalism has spilled over into geopolitical confrontation’ (p.82). They conclude that ‘Ukraine defends its independence, yet that is neither the totality nor the dominant characteristic of the war’ which flows from ‘inter-imperialist competition’ (p.97). They draw comparable conclusions in terms of the tensions over Taiwan (p.93).

Next, Tanner Mirrlees explores the ongoing tech war between the US and China. He notes that ‘a new type of asymmetric rivalry between the US and China has emerged that is not identical to the inter-imperial rivalries of the early 20^th century but is still marked by a form of national industrial competition and geo-strategic conflict’ (p.106).

The chapter shows the degree to which China has been able to assert its own interests in areas of digital technology. US efforts to limit or contain the assertion of Chinese power have not prevailed. Mirrlees stresses, however, that he is critiquing the assertion of national interests by ‘US and Chinese elites’ in order to contribute to ‘the pro-worker movements and organizations that strive for a truly different world order’ (p.130).

Chaotic world order

The sixth chapter, by Achin Vanaik, examines the historical roots and present role of Modi’s ‘Hindutva-based project’ (p.161) within the present uncertain world order. He considers India’s accommodation with the US-led power bloc, which is not without its tensions, and its adversarial relationship with China.

Vanaik suggests that an ‘emergent power’ such as India, that seeks to assert its own interests on the global stage, operates in a situation where both the US and China ‘are incapable of adequately addressing an increasingly unmanageable, turbulent, and chaotic world order’ (p.161). In place of Modi’s jockeying for position on behalf of Indian capitalism, he advocates ‘fighting against Modi and the forces of Hindutva in the name of progressive socialist internationalism’ (p.162).

In the seventh chapter, Ken C. Kawashima considers a series of ‘dislocations’ that have marked the development of Japanese capitalism. He traces the post-war incorporation of Japan into the US-dominated world order as a demilitarised power and shows how swiftly this arrangement is changing. Precisely in the context of a rivalry with China, in which the US is losing ground, a shift is underway that has led a Japanese television comedian to declare that: ‘It’s the new pre-war’ (p.165).

Kawashima notes that the ‘new defence budget will by 2027 make Japan the third largest military spender in the world’ (p.166). He explores the ideological pretensions, dangerous plans and profound material weaknesses that underlie a ‘new pre-war optimism’ (p.80) and he insists on the need ‘to push forward towards the construction of socialism’ (p.182) as the only viable alternative.

Thomas Sablowski then explores Germany’s place ‘in the new capitalist geometry.’ He first considers ‘the German economy’s fragile foundations and internal transformations,’ including the impact this has had on the capacity for working-class struggle, and then considers the country’s place within a volatile international context. This includes his assessment of the country’s ‘asymmetrical relationship’ (p.91) with the US and how this has in turn impacted the ‘common and conflicting interests’ between Russia and Germany.

Sablowski captures the thrust of his chapter with his concluding sentence. ‘As the export-orientated mode of development reaches its limits and the scope for reformist politics shrinks, the danger of authoritarian temptations grows, as does the need for radical socialist politics beyond social democracy and ‘left’ conservatism’ (p.204).

Next, Alan Cafruny and Vassilis K. Fouskas evaluate the ‘new imperial grossraums’ as they apply to Europe. They point out that, while ‘European, especially German, big capital and industries continue to compete fiercely with their US rivals on the global market’ (p.206), they have done so in a situation in which ‘the US controlled the security and the geopolitical environment of its allies …’ (p.207).

This system of US dominance and its relative equilibrium are now destabilised by a situation where ‘China, Russia and other states of the Global South, such as Iran, are not part of the hub and spoke system of US imperial primacy.’ The authors ‘argue that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added a formidable interlocking spin to this complex set of intra-imperialist and inter-imperialist dynamics.’ In this regard, the Ukraine crisis … may well have a lasting transformative impact on world politics …’ (p.208).

Eren Duzgun and Can Cemgil suggest that ‘Turkey has become an increasingly ‘unpredictable’ and ‘unintelligible’ actor in the last ten years …’ Domestic turmoil and increasingly authoritarian rule have characterised the period and a number of aggressive international interventions have also marked this period. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ‘New Turkey’ (p.224), it is suggested, has been driven forward by ‘the relative retreat of the US from the active hegemonic management of regional politics’ (p.225).

In this way, the chapter presents the belligerent and erratic trajectory of the Erdogan regime as another manifestation of an uncertain global geometry. It concludes that working-class and popular movements within Turkey must address the ‘crisis of the political system and its geo-political setting’ (p.245).

Challenging a US fiefdom

Claudio Katz presents the challenge to US hegemony by China in sharp terms with a chapter on ‘the new geopolitical situation in Latin America. The region is the site of ‘an important battle in the new Cold War – a battle the United States is waging globally in its bid to regain primacy’ (p.247). Katz is clear that ‘China has driven an unprecedented wedge into the old fiefdom of the United States’ (p.248).

The chapter asserts that in ‘just 20 years, the Eastern giant has managed to achieve an economic presence similar to that of its main rival’ (p.248). Katz suggests that the ‘US State Department has been stunned by China’s overwhelming entry into the Americas’ but that it has ‘been unable to develop an effective strategy in the face of such a challenge.’ This is largely attributable to the fact that China ‘avoids frictions in the geopolitical and military arenas’ (p.249).

Lindsey German looks at the state of the British anti-war movement and the context in which it operates. She notes the vast increases in military spending marking the present period and suggests that the ‘invasion of Ukraine by Russia has changed economic, military and political calculations across Europe and further afield’ (p.261). Rivalry with China is also driving the race towards catastrophic military conflicts.

German brings out the role of political leaders and media in steering a course towards war. She considers the divisions on the left that have arisen in the context of the crisis in Ukraine and challenges the notion that opposition to the role of the Western powers in driving the conflict constitutes a ‘dangerous capitulation to Putin’s aggression’ (p.269). She explores the problems confronting the anti-war movement and concludes that the ‘importance of socialist arguments against war is greater than ever’ (p.277).

James Meadway considers ‘the world economy since Covid’ and presents it as ‘the first crisis of the Anthropocene.’ He has little patience for ‘orthodox Marxist accounts’ that, he insists, hold ‘the breakdown of the stable natural environment [to be] secondary to the operation of the presumed falling rate of profit’ (p.281). Some on the left have paid insufficient attention to environmental questions but this assertion is hardly justified. Certainly, there is absolutely no reason why attention to the fundamental question of profitability within capitalism should preclude proper consideration the societal and economic impacts of the environmental catastrophe that is unfolding.

His rejection of Marxist conclusions with regard to ‘“fetters” on the forces of production’ notwithstanding, Meadway provides an extremely thought-provoking account of how capitalism’s assault on the natural world has become a source of massive disruption for capitalist societies and economies. As he puts it, this ‘end of “cheap nature” is also the end of relative stability in the system’s core and in its primary institutions’ (p.281). From this, he draws the conclusion that ‘a new mass politics is essential’ that must grapple with ‘collective survival in the Anthropocene’ (p.300).

In the final chapter, Birgit Mahnkopf assesses the end of a unipolar world order in terms of ‘a new shift from geoeconomics to geopolitics’ (p.312) in which genuine ‘hard power’ instruments of state power are increasingly on the agenda again’ (p.314). Notably, ‘this includes the conquest, control and defence of territories in proxy wars …’ (p.314).

In this situation, where ‘hard power’ (p.314) will be employed against major rivals, ‘highly equipped states are in a position to actually pursue “energy security”’ (p.316). This extends to competition over key minerals and other vital resources. Mahnkopf argues that this means, disastrously, that ‘we are today faced with a ‘climate endgame instead of socioecological transformation’ (p.328). This constitutes ‘a “race for what is left,” which we call the “renewal of geopolitics,” while ignoring that we are confronted with the limits of our civilization as such’ (p.329).

Clearly, this volume was not compiled in an effort to provide conclusive answers to the dilemmas of the present period or to set out any definitive strategies to respond to them. The chapters are not written in such a spirit and most of their conclusions, with regard to working-class action and socialist solutions, are framed in general terms. The contributions are presented to further understanding of important aspects of the global situation from a significant range of perspectives. Moreover, the present work is part of a work in progress in which Socialist Register is engaged.

I reviewed last year’s Socialist Register for Socialist Project in Canada. Like the present volume, it lived up the commitment of the late Leo Panitch to explore ‘the arrangement of social forces, the structure of capitalist class power, the specificity of state institutions, and the like, within a particular historical moment’ (p. 247). It sought to provide ‘a careful accounting of the organizational means by which capitalists accumulate assets and wealth [so as to] understand the parameters of power in capitalist society’ (p.x).

Socialist Register 2024 has a more precise objective, however, and turns its attention to the critically important question of the declining of hegemonic US power and the weakening of a unipolar global order. Given the significant role that Panitch and Ginden’s The Makingof Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of the American Empire played in evaluating an era of robust US domination, it is significant and important that the major changes underway during the present period are being explored in this volume.

The weakening of US hegemony and the effort to preserve it in the face of serious rivalry are essential considerations for socialists. This historic development, moreover, is playing out in a period of great volatility and uncertainty, overshadowed by extreme levels of environmental degradation. It requires decisive interventions by working-class movements but it also demands very serious analysis and vigorous debate. This volume makes an important contribution to this process.

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