Chris Bambery examines the repercussions of the fall of Assad, and the dangers ahead in the imperialist rivalries that remain in play 

Whither Syria? It is a vital question given its strategic location at the centre of middle-eastern affairs. Its rich history at the centre of the Arab and Islamic world should also be recalled. 

The central grouping in the coalition which ended the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni Muslim group that was previously affiliated with al Qaeda and is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the United Nations. It has a repressive and bloody record of rule in its mini-state based on Idlib in North West Syria. 

The new authorities in Damascus have said they wish to build an inclusive government and to rebuild the police. Whether that happens is the big question. If it is a Sunni Islam dominated regime, the minorities – Alawite, Shi’a, Druze and Christian – will have fears of a repeat of what they suffered under Isis during the civil war. 

Turkey has provided direct assistance to HTS. A Turkish military presence in the northwestern Syrian town of Idlib largely shielded the group from attacks by Syrian government forces, allowing it to run the province undisturbed for years. Turkey allowed foreign aid into the HTS mini-state, which benefitted the local population. Trade across the Turkish border was vital too to the enclave’s survival. 

‘De-escalation’ zones 

The existence of the HTS mini-state flowed from the Astana project, which began in 2017, between Russia, Turkey and Iran. Those three states set out to prevent a fresh war in Syria by creating four so-called de-escalation zones: the first was in the region around Idlib controlled by HTS. The second, north of Damascus, was controlled by Jaysh al-Islam, a Salafist coalition linked to Saudi Arabia. The third, in Northern Homs province, was controlled by a network of rebel groups, including HTS. The fourth was made up of rebel-held areas along the border with Jordan: an area which played a crucial role in the fall of the Assad regime. 

In an analysis published in 2022 by the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Zenonas Tziarras has argued that the Astana process ‘has been heavily influenced by the interests and positions’ of the three states centrally involved: Iran, Russia and Turkey. ‘As the scope of the process became wider, encompassing political and constitutional aspects, some of its shortcomings in the areas of representation and ownership became more salient,’ Tziarras said. ‘It has thus been questionable the extent to which Astana contributes to peace in Syria or reinforces a status quo and legitimizes foreign involvement, against the country’s unity and political transition to a post-conflict future.’ 

What the Astana project also did was allow Russia to act as the broker between Turkey and Assad. Russia wanted to keep Erdogan alongside its interests in relation to other problem areas: Ukraine and Libya for example. 

In recent years, Moscow has been distancing itself from Assad. A turning point came in 2019 when the Russians offered to rebuild and rearm the Syrian army. Assad rejected the offer because he was increasingly looking to building good relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: the route to normalising his relations with the Arab states and then the West. 

Prior to the seizure of Aleppo by HTS and its allies, the Russians, like Turkey, were urging Assad to bring sections of the opposition into his government. Assad rejected that. In October, while Assad was still weighing the matter up, Erdogan stymied plans for a rebel offensive in Aleppo. But with Assad’s rejection of Russia and Turkey’s advice, when rebel forces launched their campaign in late November, they did so with Erdogan’s approval. 

Turkey’s calculations 

Erdogan believed military action by his Syrian allies would force Assad’s hands. I don’t think Erdogan saw the Syrian regime collapsing so rapidly with little or no fight. HTS is an ally of Turkey, not a puppet, and Erdogan will be nervous about how much control he has over the organisation. 

The Russians launched some air strikes after Aleppo fell, but then sat on their hands. Iran had earlier urged Assad to take action over the military build-up in Idlib, warning that an attack was likely. Assad ignored the warning. When Aleppo fell, and it became apparent the Syrian army would not fight, Moscow and Tehran both came to the conclusion there was nothing they could do to save the regime. In his dreams, Erdogan wants a quasi-Ottoman solution – a reference to the old Ottoman Empire which dominated not just the Middle East but much of the Islamic world – by creating a friendly, Sunni Islam state in Syria. 

Writing for Chatham House, Galip Dalay, points to Erdogan’s objectives in Syria: ‘Before the fall of Assad, four key goals featured prominently in Turkey’s Syria policy: a partial refoulement of Syrian refugees; border security; rolling back the political and territorial gains of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF); and extracting some concessions from the regime for its allied Syrian opposition groups in any negotiations. With the fall of the regime, the fourth goal has become obsolete. However, Ankara will try to achieve its other goals through its influence with the new leaders in Damascus and its connection with the Arab community and Arab tribes – while maintaining military pressure on the SDF.’ 

Even before Damascus fell, Turkish forces and their ally, the Syrian National Army, seized Kurdish villages controlled by the SDF. The SDF is allied with the US, which has some 1000 troops in eastern Syria. How much that will help them, it remains to be seen. The SDF had been hoping to get Western recognition of its mini-state, but I do not see that happening. Indeed, the West seems to want the Kurds to join the new transitional government in Damascus; I doubt they see that as an attractive option. 

Some on the left have seen the Kurdish mini-state as a re-run of the Paris Commune. Aside from that being delusional, it ignores the fact that, time after time, Kurdish forces – whether in Turkey, Iran or Syria – have entered into alliances with imperialist and regional powers only to be let down, and no nearer to creating Kurdistan. 

Israel’s belligerence 

Into this mix, enter Israel. It has seized more territory on the Golan Heights, occupied by it back in 1967, and is now engaged in a bombing campaign to degrade military and naval facilities across Syria. It clearly has no interest in a united Syrian state re-emerging. 

Benjamin Netanyahu was jubilant when Assad fell. In truth, the Assad regimes, father and son, have lived in peace with Israel since the 1973 war, despite Israel occupying the Golan Heights back in 1967. 

Netanyahu believes Hezbollah’s supply routes from Iran are now closed. The current truce was just for sixty days. The question is whether Israel will resume operations against a weakened Hezbollah. Given Netanyahu’s track record, the likelihood is yes. The current situation will also encourage him to urge Washington to join an attack on Iran. That would be a conflict beyond all others in the region and the US and Israel would find this would be no re-run of Iraq in 2003. The question here is whether an isolated Iran would respond by building a nuclear bomb, which it is capable of doing. I fear the answer to that is yes. 

There are talks between Iran and the US and there are those in Iran who dream Donald Trump could repeat President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s surprise secret trip to Beijing in 1972 to normalise relations between the US and China. Perhaps, but the odds against are formidable, not least the number of pro-Israel, anti-Iran hawks in the incoming Trump team. 

Turning back to Netanyahu, he runs an increasingly theocratic state where his government believes, not just that they have God on their side, but that Israel must prevail over all its enemies because if it does not, it is doomed. Thus they believe they must go for war with Iran. 

That conclusion ignores the fact that Israel is internally divided (the more secular Zionists hate Netanyahu, but don’t give a fig for Palestinians, Arabs or Muslims), the economy is in serious difficulties, the state is an international pariah, more than half a million people have left the country, and it can’t defeat Hamas, let alone Hezbollah. But no matter: push on, even if Armageddon looms. 

Danger and instability 

Tragically, the Palestinians must feel even more isolated in the face of Israel’s genocide, and that eyes of the world have shifted away from Gaza. Let us ensure that does not happen.  

Finally, what of Russia? This is a set-back for Putin but one he saw coming. Faced with its war in Ukraine, Russia could not countenance the scale of intervention needed to save Assad. It threw him under the bus. It will now negotiate with Turkey, but from a weakened position. It is unlikely to retain its naval base in Syria. 

But will Biden and his European allies cheer? The truth is that the fall of Assad will not make an iota of difference to Ukraine, where the Russians are edging towards victory in an awful war of attrition. 

Building an inclusive government in Syria is a tall order, but that is not something which is going to be resolved in isolation. The presence of Israeli, Turkish, Russian and US forces there creates instability, allied as they are to various rival factions. 

Syria does not need any more foreign intervention. It has become a plaything for imperial and sub-imperial powers. Foreign troops need to withdraw: all of them. Any illusions that the West will step in to help rebuild Syria should be dispelled immediately too. 

Back in 2003, the former commander of Nato’s forces in Europe, Wesley Clark, revealed that  he had met a senior military officer in Washington in November 2001, in the immediate wake of 9/11, who told him the Bush administration planned to attack Iraq first before, over the next five years, enforcing regime change in six other states: Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia and Sudan. 

It’s taken longer than five years, but only Iran remains standing. What are the results in the remaining six states? Chaos, deep instability and humanitarian nightmares. Back in 2001, President George W. Bush famously said, ‘we don’t do nation building’. That remains true. 

Across the Atlantic, the overwhelming concern of Starmer, Macron and Scholz on hearing the news of Damascus’s fall was to send back Syrian refugees and freezing asylum applications within days. 

No matter there is a desperate shortage of food and energy and the infrastructure has been destroyed; no matter no-one knows if the civil war if over: send them back. It’s straight from the Le Pen, Melloni and Farage textbook. Rather, Syria deserves international aid to rebuild. No word of that in Washington and other Western capitals. 

Good riddance to Assad, but I will hold off from cheering what the future holds. The Middle East and the wider region have never been more unstable or more dangerous.